

**Analysis of the patterns and processes of conflict resolution
In Sudan: 1983-2011**

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Abstract

Sudan experienced the longest civil war in the history of conflict in Africa up to 2011. The first civil war started after independence in 1956 and lasted till 1972, while the second ran from 1983 to 2011, when Southern Sudan seceded in 2011 via a referendum. The first conflict followed Khartoum's failure to implement the agreement made with Southerners before independence from Britain in 1956. Southern soldiers mutinied and the war broke out. The soldiers then formed a militia group called 'Anyanya', which was led by General Joseph Lagu (Rtd.). The primary demand of this group was equality in all spheres of national life. The second civil war ended after implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was signed in 2005. The second war took protracted patterns and processes before it could be ended in 2011. This paper however, examines and analyses the patterns and processes involved in the negotiations for peace on four tracks which are as follow: Track One: Involvement of the North and South Sudanese who organised conferences from the grassroots up to the level of the warlords on how the conflict could be resolved. This marked the foundation on which other processes were built. Track Two: Involvement of the sub-regional organization Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which organised and moderated the conferences held both within and outside Sudan from 1983 to 2011. Track Three: Involvement of the US, the EU, the Troika countries, and China. These countries spent millions of US dollars trying to end the war. Track Four: Involvement of international organisations such as the UNSC and the AU in collaboration with IGAD. The study adopts content analysis research methods. It utilises primary sources, which were accessed from different repositories in Nigeria, Sudan, and South Sudan, such as the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan. The work is organised thematically and chronologically. The study establishes that internal mechanisms contributed extensively to the resolution of the Sudanese conflicts in 2011. Without it hostilities would most certainly have continued. It also played an important role in the secession of South Sudan from Sudan without recourse to war.

Keywords: Agreement, Civil War, Sudan, Peace, Secession



Introduction

Although many different approaches were adopted to resolve the conflict in the Sudan from 1970 to 2011, little scholarly attention has been paid to the internal dimension of these efforts. Most of the scholarship has focused on the external mechanisms involved in not only the Sudanese conflict but also in other African conflicts. Academically, this paper is therefore significant because it explores the internal mechanism of conflict resolution in the protracted Sudanese case, i.e. from 1970 to 2011. In terms of the social pursuit of regional and world peace, the paper is also significant as groups seeking legal secession may adapt the Sudanese patterns and processes to suit the demands of their own struggle. It is on this argument that this paper examined and analysed the patterns and processes in which the conflict ended in 2011.

The study makes the following contribution to knowledge:

The study establishes that internal mechanism (peace from within " [alsalam min alddakl] in the North and people to people peace processes [alnnas 'iilaa eamaliat salam alnnas] in the South) were effectively adopted in resolving Sudanese civil war from 1970-2011, a factor to which not much attention has been paid in the analysis of the resolution of the Sudanese civil war. The study further reveals the importance of adopting a multi-track approach to conflict resolution in Africa, with internal mechanism being fruitfully combined with external ones in the efforts to achieve peace and stability on the continent.

The Patterns and Processes of Negotiating to Resolve Sudan's Second Civil War, 1983-2005

As the war progressed in 1983; Breidlid, (2014)¹ observed that it became evident that neither Khartoum nor the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army SPLM/A could win the war militarily. Khartoum forces never had lasting victories over the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). And the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army SPLM/A, despite pushing into areas of the North, was never able to instigate armed revolt within the core 'Arab triangle' around Khartoum. Both parties therefore resolved to adopt internal mechanisms for ending the war. Efforts geared towards adopting the internal mechanism began during the late 1990s and ran into the early 2000s and it is necessary to examine the dynamics of the process. Malok, (2009),² established that al Bashir's control on power had come under increasing pressure and criticism even among Arabs in Northern Sudan, especially after he fell out with his one-time right-hand man and chief adviser to his government, Hassan al-Turabi, in 2004. Al-Turabi subsequently became al Bashir's biggest political opponent in Northern politics; hence the latter's efforts at restructing his control of the National Congress Party (NCP). In the

¹This author has written extensively on Sudan conflict. Therefore it is apparent to make reference to him in this work.

² He was a citizen of South Sudan who has represented the country in different foras. He has also written both published and unpublished intellectual materials on the subject.

same vein, Le Riche, and Arnold, (2012),³ noted that even Khartoum had also become increasingly isolated internationally as a result of the regime's overt support for Islamist terrorist in the early and mid-1990s, along with providing a sanctuary for the high-profile left-wing terrorist Carlos the Jackal.

Furthermore, the third parties made their recommendations within the country political class, but al Bashir's regime could not singlehandedly resolve the conflict as it tried to do. Luckily, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) itself would later realise the inevitability of negotiations. In an interview with Hassan al-Turabi in 1999 attributed that both parties also realised that they could not earn revenues from oil if there was no peace. Although, peace negotiations were ongoing throughout the war, at the grassroots and national levels and often parallel to or in outright competition with each other. Northerners had adopted the "peace from within" technique while Southerners had chosen the "people to people peace process." These local initiatives or internal mechanisms were an important tool introduced to ensure a resolvable end to the Sudanese conflict in 2011.

Goldsmith, (2015),⁴ stated that, beginning from 1993, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) started mediating between warring parties both from the North and South of Sudan. The first significant milestone of Inter-Governmental Authority of Development (IGAD's) effort was a Declaration of Principles (DoP), which was achieved in September 1994, postulating the right of the South to self-determination through a referendum and secular democracy within a unified Sudan. IGAD's impact led to substantive and conclusive negotiations between the warring parties. The Declaration of Principles (DoP) was supported by the SPLM/A and IGAD members. During the meetings, however, the DoP was previously rejected by the Government of Sudan (GoS) because it suggested self-determination for Southern Sudan when the GoS preferred limited federalism or autonomy rather than secession.

Another reason given by the Sudanese government for rejecting the DoP was that it did not want to mix Islamic tenets with the laws of the Sudanese state. In contrast, and despite their own hesitance about the overreaching ramifications of Southern self-determination, the SPLM/A's partners in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), mostly the Democratic Unity Party (DUP) and the Umma Party (UP), later accepted these principles as a basis for ending the conflict through an agreement known as the Asmara Declaration of 1995. (Weldesellassie, 2009).⁵ Surprisingly, the Government of Sudan GoS accepted the Peace Charter of 1996 and the 1987 Khartoum Agreement which was signed by Dr. Rick Machar and Dr. Lam Akol, but these agreements were dishonoured by the same GoS which signed them. At an IGAD summit in July 1997 Kenya's President Arap Moi, having seen the worsening conditions on the battlefield,

³ He made great input on the reasons in which Sudanese's government was classified as a terrorist country in the 1990s. Thereby calling the attention of regions powers to the role Sudan played in state sponsor terrorism.

⁴ IGAD is a regional organisation whose primary goal was to redeem the Eastern African from draught that faced the region. But later changed to find solution to the conflict in Sudan which has claimed thousands of lives. The mediation of the regional organisation was very tremendous in conflict resolution in Sudan.

⁵ Asmara Declaration of 1995 was one of the foremost declarations that comprehended and accepted the plight of the southern Sudanese and solicited for self determination.

advised the GoS to accept the DoP as a non-binding basis for conclusive negotiations at an IGAD summit in July 1997. For the GoS the DoP was acceptable because, although it recommended prioritizing Sudanese unity, it did not consider the option of granting independence to the South through a referendum should unity be ultimately impossible. Without specifying any constitutional forms, the DoP further declared that a secular and democratic state must be established in Sudan. (Garang, 2005).⁶ Despite these steps, many more years of disagreement followed because the National Conscience Party (NCP) made frantic efforts to renegotiate the terms of the DoP, oftentimes refusing to the agreed agendas of the meetings and then following up its refusal with seemingly conciliatory and cooperative pronouncements. The GoS handling of the DoP made it difficult to agree on the modalities for comprehensive peace talks. There were fundamental differences in the interpretation of the DoP by the NCP and the SPLM/A. The parties to the conflict in Sudan differed on the following points: (1) where the referendum should be held (2) the duration for the interim period – the SPLM/A wanted two years and the GoS wanted four (3) the relations between religion and the state.

The internal mechanism was also adopted in addressing the following questions during the negotiations: Which Sudanese would make up Southern Sudan? Which areas would be the borderline between Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan? By August 1998 the SPLM/A had agreed that the Upper Nile, Equatoria, and Bahr al-Ghazal regions should constitute Southern Sudan. Another contending issue among Southern Sudanese was the status of the Blue Nile State, Nuba Mountains, and Abyei regions which were not mention as part of Southern Sudan but would be determined in any concluding peace agreement via a referendum.

Eager to see an end to the Sudanese conflict, the international community initiated various processes involving all the parties. Of crucial significance were US efforts following the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001. It was discovered that Osman bin Laden had been a guest of al-Turabi and the National Islamic Front (NIF) and had in fact been offered sanctuary in Khartoum. Therefore, under the leadership of John Danforth, the Bush administration's Special Envoy, the US first focused on securing a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains as a litmus test for the warring parties' sincerity with regard to more comprehensive peace efforts. From January 2002, the ceasefire proved generally successful, catalysing the IGAD process to achieve wider agreement in Sudan. However, the IGAD peace process gained momentum in mid-2002 after nearly a decade of intermittent efforts.

President Moi of Kenya, under the direct guidance of Kenyan Army General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, on 20th July 2002 finally formalised the Machakos Protocol. The Protocol was meant to serve as a binding foundation for comprehensive and conclusive negotiations between the NCP and the SPLM/ A. The sanctioned themes were those which had emerged through the protracted DoP discussions of the mid-1990s, namely a 'Right to Self-Determination for the

⁶ He was the last leader the witnessed all the conferences held to liberate South Sudanese from the Northern Sudanese accept the last conference where the Naivasha Agreement was signed. He was killed in an helicopter accident when was returning from Kenya on an office meeting.

people of South Sudan' and an understanding between the state and religion that removed Shariah as the basis for governance in Southern Sudan. (Garang, 2005) Hoile, (2002),⁷ noted that the Machakos Protocol succeeded in bringing the warring parties to agree finally to a 'grand compromise' which established the subsequent Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) peace processes. Specifically, the SPLM/A received Khartoum's binding commitment to Southern self-determination with the distinct possibility of independence. The protocol stipulated a six-year interim process which led to Southern referendum on unity or independence from Sudan. In exchange, the NCP received the SPLM/A's acceptance that Islamic law would still be the basis for governance in the North and the national constitution, except as applied within the South. Furthermore, it was emphasised within the protocol that "the unity of the Sudan...is and shall be the priority" and that "making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan" would be legally imperative to both the SPLM/A and the NCP, thus qualifying the possibilities of Southern self-determination.

With a ceasefire declared, and using the Machakos Protocol as a foundation, the negotiations continued under the auspices of IGAD but were now supported by a 'Troika of influential states': the US, the UK, and Norway. From 2003 to 2004, six thematic protocols were negotiated in Naivasha, Kenya. The Agreement on Security Arrangements was signed on 25 September 2003. In contrast to the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, the South was allowed to maintain an independent armed force, which was the SPLA, to act as a guarantee during the Interim Period. Additionally, there were to be 'joint integrated units' composed by both the SEF and the SPLM/A and deployed in the North and the South. Should unity be ultimately chosen, these units were to form the nucleus of a new national army. Lastly, the SAF and SPLA units were to redeploy respectively to the North and the South within two and a half years from the start of the Interim Period.

On 7 January 2004, the Agreement on Wealth Sharing was finalised, relatively easily, by dividing the significant oil revenue originating in the South evenly between Khartoum and the Government of Southern Sudan, after two per cent had been given to the region from which it was derived. The Protocol on Power Sharing was signed next, on 26 May 2004, and was particularly important as its stipulation would form the basis for the long-term structure of the Sudanese State. Should unity be chosen in the Southern referendum, Southern Sudan would have its own regional government and the North would have a similar structure. Accordingly, during the Interim Period, Southern Sudan would have an autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), with a President and a Parliament which would be responsible for the basic governance of the South. At the national level, an interim Government of National Unity (GoNU) would rule through a President supported by two Vice Presidents and a Parliament. While the protocol dictates that there must be elections at all levels of governance within four years of the Interim Period's beginning, prior to that the SPLM and NCP would form the governing parties in the GoSS and GoNU respectively, with the SPLM assured of the first Vice Presidency. Alongside the power sharing agreement, the Protocol on the Resolution of the conflict in Abyei

⁷ The agreement was a land breaking in finding solutions to the conflict in Sudan which has been traced by history lasted for the period of 191 years. This to say, from 1820-2011.

and the Protocol on the Resolution of the conflict in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States were also signed. These agreements assured Abyei of special administrative status under the national Sudanese presidency during the Interim Period and confirmed that a referendum would be undertaken simultaneously with the Southern referendum, allowing it to choose whether to join an independent Southern Sudan or to remain with the North. The 'Transitional Areas of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States were provided with nebulous 'popular consultations' to determine whether the peace process had 'met public aspirations.' Controversially, the SPLM/A acquiesced to NCP demands that the states of Western Kordofan and Nuba Mountains should be merged to form a new state, Southern Kordofan. This was a major concession since it meant the dilution of the SPLM/A presence in the Nuba Mountains within the new, larger state. Furthermore, implementation modalities, which were expansive and exceptionally detailed these protocols together, formed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was generated through the internal mechanism of 'peace from within' and 'people to people peace process.' The Agreement was signed on 9th January 2005 in Naivasha by John Garang on behalf of the SPLM/A and Vice President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha for the NCP, under the watchful eyes of the international community. The CPA was a notable achievement and met many core Southern aspirations.

The CPA was indeed a major achievement, though predicated largely on continued international community support. Most simply understood as a 'one Sudan, two systems framework.' It allowed for a significant measure of Southern autonomy, and the right to self-determination through the concluding referendum. Indeed, for many Sudan observers, it was remarkable that Khartoum, particularly in the extreme form of the NCP, would concede so much – most significantly the referendum itself and a new constitution allowing for secularism in the south. Equally amazing was Khartoum's agreement to a 50-50 sharing formula for the country's oil wealth, the creation of a national unity government with SPLM participation in the presidency and future power sharing, the redeployment of SAF from the South and the maintenance of the SPLA, and a UN peacekeeping force with a Chapter VI mandate. Some of the agreements reached and signed and which later resulted in the drafting of the CPA are presented in the table below:

Table 1: Some of the conferences and agreements signed during the scope of study

| S / N | Conference | Year | Purpose | Venue | Remark |
|-------|-----------------------|------|--|----------|------------------|
| 1 | Addis Ababa Agreement | 1972 | To resolve the first civil war | Ethiopia | Purpose achieved |
| 2 | Abuja 1 | 1992 | To make the warring parties agreed on terms to end the civil war | Nigeria | Dishonoured |
| 3 | IGADD process begins. | 1993 | As above | Kenya | As above |

| | | | | | |
|---|--|------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------|
| 4 | Sudan Peace Agreement | 1997 | As above | Sudan | As above |
| 5 | Machakos Protocol: Entebbe Conferences | 2002 | As above | Uganda | Honoured. |
| 6 | Naivasha Protocol: Signing of the CPA | 2005 | As above | Kenya | Honoured |
| 7 | South Sudan Referendum | 2011 | South Sudan seceded | Sudan/South Sudan. | Honoured. |

Source: field work 2017

The Role of the International Community in Resolving the Sudanese Conflict

Before the signing of the CPA in 2005, different external actors had taken various steps to end the conflict. The signing of the CPA on 9th January 2005 at Naivasha was the final move which ended the longest civil war in Africa, following sustained pressure from the international community, including the UN Security Council. Various European nations and the US also joined in negotiations to peacefully resolve the conflict. The Troika made up of Britain, the US and Norway had similar objectives as African nations. Special representatives of these countries came to Sudan to negotiate with the parties. From 1993 to 2005 the 'Troika nations' collaborated with IGAD and aided the regional organisation in hastening the peace process. The US government also played an active role in ensuring that both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the CPA. In 1989, former US President Jimmy Carter visited Sudan and urged the actors to end the war. But, as Prof. Joram Bisworo in an oral interview noted, the former US president

...did not realise that war could not stop if its causes were not addressed. He further said that President Carter had no profound knowledge and understanding of the dimensions and dynamics of the Sudanese socio-cultural conflict.⁸

Despite this, the US Government remained supportive of the Carter Peace Initiative and even sent a high-level State Department delegation led by Ambassador Irving Hicks with a message that it would do everything necessary to resolve the conflict amicably. The mission's objectives were however not accomplished because the contenders did not accept the US Government's approach. Nevertheless, the US Government continued to search for a pathway to peace in Sudan. In 1990 US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, came to South Sudan and presented America's blueprint for peace to Dr. John Garang, assuring Garang that if the blueprint was strictly

⁸ Prof. Joram Bisworo was a A. U. Representative to South Sudan of the time the author visited Juba in 2017 for a field on the Sudan conflict and peace study. I had a person chat with him where he revealed many things to me on the cause on the conflict resolution.

adhered to, there would be peace between the GoS and the SPLM/A. (Malok, 2009).⁹ The contents of the blueprint centered on the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces to agreed positions, resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced and negotiation between the two major actors, that is, the GoS and the SPLM/A. For the second time, the US Government could not achieve its mission in resolving the conflict because the conflicting sides failed to implement the contents of the blueprint.

France also intervened in the process. In May 1991 the country arranged a secret meeting in Paris between the principal actors. Dr. Ismail Osman represented the GoS while Elijah Malok represented the SPLM/A. The meeting was arranged through Paul Djoud, Director for African Affairs. He told the two representatives that the meeting was being organised by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Quai d'Orsay. Present also at the meeting were other high-level French government officials. During the discussions, representatives of the French Government asked: "Will the warring parties like the Government of France to get involved in the peace process?" The reactions of both representatives of the GoS and SPLM/A marked the failure of the Paris meeting. The Government of France was also told that a similar meeting had been rescheduled to take place in Nigeria in May 1992. According to Dr. Laben Moro,¹⁰ the discussions with the French Government centered on how the conflict could be resolved, granting humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons and how the French government could assist the SPLM/A in South Sudan. France also attempted to initiate series of meetings between Dr. John Garang and Omar al Bashir, but this proved unsuccessful due to the attitude of the former.

The Role of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The Sudanese neighbouring states have tried to end the second civil war in Sudan since 1993. The East Africa regional organisation which is Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), though earlier known as Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which the former aim was to resolve the drought ravaging the region but when there was need to resolve conflict within the region of East Africa, it also embraced conflict resolution into its charter. The first step taken by IGAD in 1994 was to call the two principal actors to the conflict to adopt and sign a Declaration of Principle (DoP). SPLM/A signed the document but Government of Sudan (GoS) did not sign nor adopt until 1997, through the diplomatic shuttle played by IGAD, the GoS later accepted the DoP. In 1994 the New Sudan Council of Churches sent its members to IGAD leaders, in support of IGAD's peace initiatives in 1994. The Sudan Working Group also played its role by encouraging the regional organisation to continue with the work of resolving the conflict. The major objective set down by the DoP was aimed at instituting self-determination and cordial relations between the North and the South on religious matters.

⁹ Sudan could not rest their resolution on the proposed blue print by USA government. The reason is very simple. It is because they have their self conflict resolution mechanism to bring the civil war to an end.

¹⁰ He was a director in the institute of peace study and conflict in Juba, South Sudan, 2017.

The DoP did not postulate on how to reach an agreement but set up a framework for good and fruitful negotiations while searching around for other peace processes, e.g. the Libyan-Egyptian Initiative which was referred to as a mere excuse for the GoS to refuse to engage seriously with IGAD modalities for negotiations. Many countries supported the IGAD peace process; these were first called 'Friends of IGAD' and later 'IGAD Partners' Forum.' In mid-1999, an IGAD secretariat was established in Nairobi for proper coordination of the activities of the organisation.

Furthermore, in 2002, Lt. General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, a Kenyan was appointed Special Envoy to IGAD. His resumption coincided with the renewed international community's commitment and, in particular, US special interest in conflict resolution in the Sudanese situation. From that moment, however, the Sudan Peace Processes began to move toward solid resolution. Various meetings both within and outside Sudan were organised and the secretariat in Nairobi was mandated to organise and manage the peace processes. In addition, the international community became involved in the processes and was led by Troika of USA, UK, and Norway while Italy and Switzerland played a significant role in bringing the principal actors to a round table in order to proffer lasting solutions to the conflict. (Wedesellasse, 2011).¹¹

With the involvement of IGAD and IGAD Partners' Forum, negotiations were accelerated to resolve the conflict and end the civil war which had both destroyed lives and property worth billions of US dollars. The negotiations in Machakos in 2002 were moved to Naivasha in 2005, and it became very glaring how exclusive the peace processes were. During the negotiation, only two parties, the SPLM/A and the GoS (National Congress Party) were present and actively involved in the negotiations. Other political parties in the North and the South were not represented. It was also noticed that neither armed groups in the south nor civil society, NGOs and religious bodies were given a space to make input during the Naivasha peace processes. The reason might be that only one conflict was discussed, that is, the North-South civil war. Other demanding and pressing issues as Darfur and the Eastern Front were not given any attention. Although Abyei was included because north and south agreed that from 1905, the region has been part of the south. The Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile were included on the grounds that they were directly connected to the Southern civil war. However, the GoS insisted on a face-saving fiction whereby negotiations regarding these two areas were under the auspices of Kenya's Government, not IGAD, even though those negotiations took place in the same room with the same protagonists and mediators. (Gurtong Focus Monthly).¹² The major parties involved were supported by advisors and in this way the church managed to exert some influence on the negotiations, as a number of the advisors were church members and were being briefed by the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC).

Nevertheless, the IGAD-sponsored negotiations were soon brought to a halt on the issue of separation of state and religion. The National Islamic Force (NIF) religious leaders, who were the custodians and guardians of state sovereignty in Sudan, remained adamant that the state was theocratic and Islam would remain

¹¹ This author has been referring to previously.

¹² This is monthly which extensively published articles on the conflict.

the guiding principle and the source of governance and legislation. These Islamic clerics promulgated an Islamic constitution in 1997 thereby making the SPLM/A to militate for a confederation arrangement between the fighting (or New) Sudan and the non-fighting (or Old) Sudan. The SPLM/A recognised that the Northern political establishment had opted freely to self-determine by deciding to be governed by an Islamic constitution. Consequently, the marginalised peoples in Southern Kordofan, Southern Blue Nile, and Southern Sudan who formed the bulk of the SPLM/A politico-military organisation also started clamouring for self-determination through a referendum at the end of an agreed interim period. The ideology of the NIF galvanised the SPLM/A to begin to agitate for secession or self-determination through a referendum at the end of an agreed interim period.

Meredith, (2005),¹³ furthermore stated that the SPLM/A official position on the peace negotiation table remained that of a confederation arrangement to be put in place during the interim period. This was based on the belief that there were areas of commonality where the two states could cooperate, but each state would be largely responsible for its own security, administration, and foreign relations. At the end of the interim period, internationally supervised referendum would be held in the Southern State so that the South proper, the Nuba people and the people of Southern Blue Nile would vote freely to either remain in a qualified united Sudan or to opt for independent political existence.

Agreements Concluded between Government of Sudan and Several Fighting Groups

This was done in order to resolve the conflict through the use of internal mechanisms or local initiatives among the Sudanese without the interference of external intervention. Therefore, the Sudanese used 'peace from within' in the Northern Sudan to achieve this and the 'people to people peace processes' in the Southern Sudan to achieve the set objectives. The agreements reached are as follow:

1. The Mazloum Brigade Agreement concluded between the brigade and Upper Nile State government in 1992. The Upper Nile region agreed that the state will provide a comprehensive development programme in Mazloum. To provide safety in the Nile to the cruising boats between Kosti and Malakal. The agreement between United Front and the GoS in 1992 concluded under the auspices of the Reth (Shilluk king) secured the navigable stretch of the Nile between Kosti in the north Malakal in the south. This has created stability and led to an increase in agricultural production and an expansion in the output of gum Arabic.
2. The agreement between the GoS and SPLM/A fighters at Bantiu in 1993 led to stability in Unity state and opened the river navigation course between Bantiu and Malakal. The GoS agreed with peace forces led by Col. Gabriel Tang in 1993 to make river transport possible between Malakal and the mouth of Zaraf River.

¹³ The period of interim permit each side to have a rethink on a better way in which they could resolve the conflict peacefully without to another civil way.

3. Peace efforts continued when in June 1994 the people of El Nasir broke from the mainstream. This was followed by some Anjwak commanders joining the peace initiatives in September 1994 under the command of Mr. Simon Mori, member of the National Council. (LeRiche, and M. Arnold,2012).¹⁴

In conclusion, these intensive meetings included the field commanders that exchanged messages and notes with the state governments, commanders of the garrison, and headquarters of provinces. That led to the building of confidence and to the reinstatement of good will. The communiqué was broadcasted in local languages and dialects for the people to understand. This was followed by secret and open exchanges of visits by night and day in an effort to solve the causes of war in Sudan. A quiet dialogue was conducted among members of the one-family-one country another internal mechanism for conflict resolution is Sudanese peace process. On the general principles and lucid policies, this gave birth to the political charter in signing the CPA in 2005.

The Challenges of the Internal Mechanisms in Sudanese Conflict Resolution, 1983-2005

In an oral interview with Leban Moro, who stated that the persistence cause of intensive armed conflict between the North and South was the 1958 military coup. Until then, a large segment of the citizens of Sudan mostly from the South Sudan believed that there could still be some form of agreed political arrangement, in Parliament for co-existence between the North and South. However, the expectations of the people were dashed, when the agreed internal mechanism to resolve the conflict was dishonoured. In addition, when the Southerners realised that no other political and alternatives means to resolve the conflict and to air their grievances. They went into exile and raised political and military institutions that would fight the power in Khartoum. During the armed struggle, which ranged from 1962 through to 1972, during the first civil war, there were enormous difficulties and challenges with the southerners the chief of which were: uncertain political attitudes and national interests of host countries that housed the movement; clash of political interest and view among the southerners; divisions in the leadership of the exile movement; and lack of military equipment to fight the government of Sudan. These were the challenges of the exile southerners who were demanding for equal rights in the government of Sudan. And when these rights were no forthcoming the people resorted to armed conflict which had a tremendous effect on the Sudanese civil war. The Sudanese civil war began at a very difficult time-specifically in the early 1960s when most African states were either just getting their political independence or were struggling to get it. As a result, neighbouring East African countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika became not only hosts to the movement agitating for equal rights in Sudan but also the seat for their operations and strategies. These countries subsequently became independent as follows: Tanganyika in 1961, Uganda in October 1962 and Kenya in December 1963. None of these countries was truly in any position to give the

¹⁴ The author derived these points from the conference held through the internal mechanism to resolved the protracted civil war in Sudan.

movement the basic materials and political support they needed to fight for their freedom, as they had their own issues.

Another important challenge that prolonged the Sudanese civil war was the early attempt by Southern Sudan to secede from the North. In was their aim to bestow a sense of honour to the Southern people by creating a separate state, the African statesmen and leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo were mobilising all other independent states into forming "one United Africa." Therefore, the aim of secession was shrouded in a greater African Union. According to Dr. Leban,¹⁵ African black leaders understood the cause of the Southern Sudanese and sympathised with them but could not champion the case publicly.

Two factors were responsible for this state of things. First, Southern Sudan raised a fundamental problem that was common to Africa at that time. The region was saying that it could not cohabit with the Arabised Northern Sudan, and so wanted an independent state, an argument that was based on culture, ethnicity and race. Black African leaders could not support a breakaway because it could be setting a political precedent whose repercussions could not be gauged. For if the south broke away because of ethnic and cultural considerations, what would prevent other nationalities everywhere in Africa from breaking away to form culturally homogenous states? Moreover, at that time, Africa was experiencing a breaking up war newly independent Congo, which had made African leaders afraid that it could spread to their own countries.

The second factor, which was the reinforcement of the above argument, was the wave of pan-Africanism that had swept across the continent and which consisted of the emotional desire among the African leaders to form the United States of Africa. This desire culminated in the meeting of all heads of independent African states in Addis Ababa in May 1963 where the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) was launched. In this meeting, the leaders unanimously endorsed the following two restrictions among other clauses in the OAU charter: (a) to respect each other's territorial integrity and accepted as a binding principle, the non-interference in the internal affairs of another country; and (b) only African countries that were still under the domination of colonialism could be given material, political and diplomatic assistance. (Webster and Boahen, et al 1972).¹⁶ The first restriction practically meant that the movement struggling to free Southern Sudan could not be assisted by anyone in Africa; Sudan was an independent state and one of the founding members of OAU and any support for the armed rebellion went against the principle of new state formation. This was one of the reasons the Anya Nya movement did not have firm foundation at its beginning stage but the movement's philosophy never extinguished from its leaders.

Another challenge that faced the movement was its conflict with the national interest of the host states, especially in the East and Central Africa countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda Congo and the Central African Republic where the

¹⁵ A director in the institute for peace study and conflict resolution in Juba, South Sudan.

¹⁶ The concession reached by African head of governments was reemphasised.

presence of the movement was mostly pronounced. The activities of the movement was restricted and monitored, especially the leaders, which was done so as to debar the movement from selling their ideologies to the host countries. (Heather, Sharkey, 2011).¹⁷ But the ideology of the movement according to Anne Itto Leonardo, was that the Southern Sudanese were fighting a racial war on behalf of the black race-the Arab versus the black man. They believed that state interest went far beyond race and culture, and the state of diverse political and cultural systems, cooperates in various fields such as trade protocols, military pacts and cultural exchanges. As states, therefore, these countries had bigger national interests individually which they wanted to preserve in their relations with Sudan.

Nevertheless, the OAU member states did support, through material and diplomatic assistance, the movements that were spearheading the struggle for freedom in the colonised countries and which were mainly in Black Africa. Some of the movements include the ANC, which was struggling against the white minority rule and the apartheid government in South Africa; and the nationalist movements in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, all of whom were fighting a bush war of liberation. FRELIMO, under Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel, was fighting the Portuguese in Mozambique, Amilcar Cabral, together with his brother Luis Cabral, was leading the war for Guinea Bissau's independence, while Dr. Agostino Neto and the MPLA were physically confronting the Portuguese in Angola. The Central Africa Federation of Nyasaland (now Malawi), Southern and Northern Rhodesia had its share of problem. Southern and Northern Rhodesia was still British colonies seething under the authority and tutelage of the British Imperial Governor-General, Sir Roy Whelensky. What further prolong the Sudanese conflict was that despite the cry of the southern Sudanese to be freed from racist Arab domination, their cry was ignored.

The strategic position which the Sudan occupied in the Arab world made it more difficult for the Southern Sudanese. Upon independence in 1956 Sudan joined the Arab League and was already a senior member when the OAU was being formed. Sudan was, therefore, an important bargaining card in the context of Afro-Arab relations. In fact, the black African countries wanted Sudan and other Arab countries such as Egypt to assist in the total liberation. Thus, the case of Southern Sudan, though just, was forfeited by black and independent Africa and none of the countries publicly raised the issue with the Sudan Government that was seemingly an internal matter. The quest for a free Southern Sudan was deliberately sacrificed on the altar of the OAU. The movement in Southern Sudan on the religious ground appealed to the western world and other Christian faith organisations to look into the persecution by the Sudan Government. They were been denied freedom of worship, and also enacted a law that prohibited all Christian activities except those granted by the government. No preaching and Christian activities were allowed. General Abboud's government signed into law the 'Missionary Act' which order all Christian mission in Southern Sudan to ceased and desist from running any schools and all the schools were to revert to the government with immediate

¹⁷ The activities of Anya Nya could have public support due to the socialist ideology of the leaders which contravened the popular ideology in the region.

effect. While the operations of institutions of Christian persecution were being scale down, mosques and Koranic schools were mushrooming everywhere.

Another challenge was in respect of the divisions with the leadership of the exile movement. As noted earlier, the clash of the political interest and doctrines in South Sudan among and between various political shades of opinions had been manifested in 1947 during the Juba Conference. Although, the British Colonial Civil Secretary, Sir James Robison, had publically claimed that the Southern delegates had all thrown in their weight and lot for unity between the North and South, the true picture that emerge later was that of a very sharp division between the majority who not want anything to do with the North, and the minority who connived with the Northern delegates. These differences continued to be a common feature of public life until the military coup of 1958.

Conclusion

In concluding this paper, a few general observations will be made. One, it was too early for the independent Africa states to appreciate correctly the socio-political dimension and complexity of the challenges in Sudan mostly in the Southern Region. The political dynamics of the day focused on the liberation of Africa from the burden of colonialism. As such, it was considered impolitic to support the disintegration of an AU member state. The struggle of the Movement was therefore viewed with suspicion in some countries and outright contempt and hostility in others. Two, the leadership of Southern Sudan also became a part of the problem rather than a solution. Instead of uniting around the principle of total secession from the rest of Sudan, they were at each other's throat on non-strategic issues. As a result, no country came out publicly with material, diplomatic and political support since there was no unity of purpose among the rank and file of the leaders of the movement.

Indeed, the biggest handicap of the Anya Nya Army was the general lack of basic war logistics. Until the end of the war, the Anya Nya army had neither a single vehicle nor a modest stock of medium-range missiles. However, the Anya Nya Army bravely fought on until the government of Sudan was compelled to talk and agree on peace to come through the internal mechanism or local initiatives and later through the conventional methods of conflict resolution. The combination of the internal mechanism and conventional mechanisms finally resolved the protracted conflict in Sudan in 2011 via a referendum, a situation which is justified by the Human Need Theory on Conflict Resolution.

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