Indigene-settlers dichotomy and social conflict in Wukari, Nigeria

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Abstract

Conflicts of varying scales and intensities have been experienced in different parts of the world. It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of these conflicts, although it is safe to say that these social unrests have taken a toll on humanity in terms of lives, displacements and disruptions of economic and social activities. Indeed, massive violent conflicts on a scale previously unimaginable have come to stare humanity in the face with their attendant adverse effects on the socio-economic development of society. In Wukari, there has been a series of social conflicts with ethnic and religious colouration and political/economic motivations. This has led to the loss of lives and destruction of property worth billions. Often, the issue of settlers/indigenes is built into the crisis, and challenging the rights and privileges of the minority by the majority and vice versa. The broad aim of this research is to examine the nexus between the indigene-settler divide and social conflict in Wukari. Theoretically, the Marxist perspective was adopted as a framework for the analysis. The target population of the study comprised the inhabitants of Wukari Local Government Area (L.G.A.), the representatives of the Muslim Council, the Christian Association of Nigeria, the Red Cross, youth community based organisations and community leaders, covering a sample size of 307 respondents. Questionnaire, Key Informant Interview (KII) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) methods were used to generate data for the study. For the quantitative data, multi-stage cluster sampling was used to sample the respondents, while for the qualitative data, the purposive sampling method was used. The findings indicate that youth were the most affected by the conflict and residential houses are the most destroyed or vandalized. Discrimination and marginalisation, accusation, unemployment,

hatred and bad governance are the key causes of the conflicts. Destabilising peace, loss of lives, more hatred leading to bifurcated settlements in the area and the collapse of business and poverty, among other things, are the consequences of conflict. Averting conflict in Wukari requires the provision of adequate security, polarised parties forming a joint community vigilante, creating employment opportunities and reduction in poverty, etc. to help in tackling the problem.

Keywords: Assessment, Attitudes, Conflict, Consequences, Ethno-religious, Indigene-settlers.

Introduction

Nigeria is a pluralist society defined by cultural and institutional diversities of ethnic groups of various populations practicing at least two religions: Christianity and Islam. There have been various statements about the extent of Nigeria's ethnic pluralism from the 250 mentioned by colonialists and even half that number by superficial observers to the figure of 374 ethnic groups (Otite, 2001)[1]. The current population estimation shows that Nigeria has over 200 million people of diverse ethnic and religious compositions (Worldometers, 2021)[2]. The composition of these different ethnic nationalities with diverse cultural values has no doubt posed a great challenge to national integration and the corporate co-existence of the people. The history of Nigeria as an independent nation-state, therefore, is incomplete without recounting her sad experience of one conflict or the other. Notable among these conflicts are the communal, the ethno-religious, and the political, which often result in destructive violence. Of all these, ethno-religious conflicts appear to have more implications for the peaceful co-existence, national security, integration, and development in Nigeria. There is hardly any part of the country that has not suffered one form of violent conflict or another.

Like most states in Nigeria, Taraba State and particularly Wukari as a major town in the state has had its fair share of violent conflicts and tensions, often resulting in the displacement of thousands of people and communities, wanton destruction of lives and property, human rights abuses, and a climate of insecurity and mutual distrust and suspicion (Women Environmental Programme [WEP], 2013)[3]. Each conflict is unique in its origin and character, but underlying denominators are manifested in land space and boundary squabbles, indigene versus settler dichotomy, chieftaincy tussles and disputed jurisdictions, competition to access scarce political and economic resources, and population growths. Of the fourteen main crises that have ravaged the state between 1991 and 2013, the most devastating ones in terms of the magnitude

1Otite, O. "On Conflicts, Their Resolution, Transformation, and Management" in Otite, O., and Albert, I.O. (eds.) Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2001.
2Nigeria Population 2021-Worldometer. "Population of Nigeria: current, historical, and projected population, growth rate". Available at www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population 2021.
3Women Environmental Programme. "Report of Rapid Assessment into Incessant Crises in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State". 2013.

of destruction occurred in Wukari (Madu and Goni, 2013)[4]. There is no gainsaying that the crisis in Wukari has been more of an inter-ethnic struggle involving the Jukuns and the Tivs, the Jukuns and the Kuteps, and the Jukuns and the Hausas for more than decades. The emergence of the Tiv-Jukun conflict in 1959, and its continuation since then, has made it the most devastating and deadliest inter-ethnic clashes in Nigeria (Egwu, 2001; Aluaigba, 2008; Nnorom & Odigbo, 2015)[5].

Surprisingly, there seems to be no end to the conflict as it keeps re-occurring with new dimensions (Aluaigba, 2008). According to Nwanegbo, Odigbo, and Ngara (2014)[6], the recent Wukari ethno-religious crisis has taken a new dimension in terms of the causative factors, the actors involved in the crisis, coverage of occurrence, the magnitude of destruction, and general impacts. For instance, between 2013 and 2014, the Wukari community experienced several devastating conflicts in which about 100 people were killed, not fewer than 300 residential houses were burnt and several other property worth millions of Naira were destroyed (Nwanegbo, Odigbo, and Ngara, 2014; Ayodele, 2013; Mkom, 2013)[7]. While these estimations may not be the true reflection of the situation in Wukari, the continuation of the crisis has posed a serious threat to the socio-economic activities of the community. In his report, Itodo Daniel of the *Weekly Trust* aptly described the lingering Wukari conflict to the world as thus:

> Violence at Wukari has become a recurrent decimal that needs to be addressed squarely by all stakeholders in the interest of peace, unity and development of the area. The recent crisis came up barely two months after an earlier one which also witnessed the loss of many lives and property worth millions of naira that were destroyed. On February 23, 2013, a mere disagreement among youths on a football pitch triggered one of them to kill his mate, and not long after, the whole town was on fire with an unimaginable level of destruction. On July 13, 2010, the town also witnessed a minor crisis over an attempt to erect a mosque at the Police Area Command (*Weekly Trust*, May 11, 2013)[8].

4Madu, A. Y., & Goni, I. "Ethno-Religious Conflict in Taraba State and Its Implications on Socio-Economic, Political and educational Development of Youths". International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Review. 4(3), 2013:149-155.

5Egwu, S. G. "Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria". Jos, 2001: St. Stephen Book House.; Aluaigba, M. T. "The Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Conflict and the Citizenship Question in Nigeria". Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and Training. Kano, 2008: Bayero University.; Nnorom, K., Odigbo, J. "Identity Crisis and the Challenge of Peace Building in Wukari, Nigeria". Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies. 4(1), 2015.

6Nwanegbo, C. J., Odigbo, J. and Ngara, O."Citizenship, Indigeneship and Settlership Crisis in Nigeria: Understanding the Dynamics of Wukari Crisis". Journal Research in Peace, Gender and Development, 4(1), 2014: 8-14.

7Ayodele, W. "Wukari Boils Again" Thisday, May 4, 2013. P. 2. Mkom, J. "5 Killed, 300 Hundred Houses Burnt in Taraba Crisis". The Sun, February 24, 2013. Pp. 1 and 6.

8Itodo, D. S. "Wukari Crisis: One Violence Too Many" Weekly Trust, May 11, 2013. P. 8.

In their words, Nnorom and Odigbo (2015)[9] state that ethnic identities have deepened the crisis in Wukari, owing to the contestations over indigenes-settlers dichotomy. This has contributed to the discriminatory practices and exclusionism in the management of communally owned resources. Consequently, the tendency to resort to violence seems popular than dialogue. For instance, Nwanegbo et al. (2014)[10] rightly argued that discrimination based on indigene-settlers identity is problematic because it is directly tied to individual or group access to societal resources, including political opportunities. As pointed out by Nnorom and Odibo (2015), the city of Wukari can be described as 'two' communities in 'one'. The community is owned and occupied by the 'sons of the soil', abiding settlers/non-indigenes, and the repulsively destroyed and isolated community as a result of the conflict. According to Mustapha (2002), cited in Nwanegbo, Odigbo, and Ngara (2014), the Jukun-Tiv, Kuteb/Hausa ethnic conflicts, most especially the 1991-2001 conflicts have had a far-reaching impact on the community people. The use of indigene/settlers to discriminate against other ethnic groups has become an important determinant in the socio-economic and socio-political relations of the community, and this has led to mutual suspicion, grievances, and tension among the people (Nwanegbo, Odigbo, and Ngara, 2014).

Considering the protracted nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari and the attendant destructions of lives and property, many questions arose. These revolve around the causes and the negative consequences of social conflict on the social, economic, and political life of the people living in the study area. It is against this background that this study seeks to examine the influence of indigene – settlers divide on the social crisis in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State.

Brief Literature Review
There is an enormous literature on the phenomenon of ethno-religious conflict locally and internationally. In sub-Saharan Africa, conflicts and other forms of social unrest are evident in the continent. Although, trends, patterns, and causative factor differ across the region, in Nigeria, the conflict has taken different dimensions and with differences in predisposing factors. The most common form of social conflict evident in Nigeria is ethno-religious conflict. In Nigeria, ethnicity can be seen as arising in any situation where a group of people, no matter how small with different cultural and linguistic attributes to those of its neighbors, uses this as the basis of solidarity and interaction with others. The belief in ethnicity leads to inevitable consequences of socio-cultural differences. These differences are observed to manifest in terms of social inequality among ethnic groups. There are also majority/minority relations, especially where there are resources to compete for or where there is a political goal to be achieved. An ethnic minority is a category of people distinguished by physical or cultural traits, who are socially disadvantaged. For instance, the Hausa-Fulani are predominantly viewed as settlers and a minority, while the

9Nnorom K., Odigbo, J. "Identity Crisis and the Challenge of Peace Building in Wukari, Nigeria": Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies. 4(1):2015.
10Nwanegbo, C. J., Odigbo, J. &Ngara, O."Citizenship, Indigeneship and Settlership Crisis in Nigeria: Understanding the Dynamics of Wukari Crisis".Journal Research in Peace, Gender and Development, 4 (1) 2014: 8-14.

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Jukun are seen as the indigenes and the majority in Wukari and its environs (Macionis and Plumme, 2005)[11].

Predictors of Conflict in Nigeria

Many scholars have attempted to take a critical look at the concept of conflict generally and particularly from the ethno-religious perspective. Otite (1979) focused his work principally on ethnic group identification, ethnic pluralism, and the quest for scarce available resources, which could be political. Ethno-religious conflict is a multi-causal variable (Salawu, 2010)[12]. No two crises are similar. It is a hard fact that ethno-religious conflicts have become a common feature of Nigerian society, despite the enormous human and financial resources committed to judicial, extra-judicial and administrative panels of inquiry and investigation into the remote and direct causes of conflicts. Adebayo (2003)[13] found that religion is fundamental in causing violence. Thus, over the past two decades, the level of religiosity has been growing tremendously in Nigeria society. This is evident in the multiplication of religious authorities, texts, discourses, and identities.

Adeyemi (2005)[14] attributed the ethnic conflicts to the undemocratic nature of governance. According to him, African leaders and rulers have repressed sections of the people and by implication, ignored their aspirations. Some have employed a divide-and-rule method in governance and created more ethno-religious divisions than the colonialists ever did. To him, once degenerated regimes find their legitimacy put in question because they no longer care for the majority of the people or protect the public good and fail to protect or defend the people's rights, they tend to identify the process of repression. He believes that when governance decays, the people retreat into sectarian enclaves, which are seen as providing security.

Machava (2008)[15] linked the roots of ethnic and religious crises to colonialism and the cold war, while some other scholars had argued that ethnic and religious crises are rooted in bad governance, the 'politiciation' of ethnic and religious identities, and competition for political power by the ethnic and religious communities (Anarfi, 2004)[16]. In relation to this, Takaya (1992)[17]

11Macionis, J.J., and Plummer, K. "Sociology: A Global Introduction", (3rd ed.), 2005. England. Prentice: Hall.

12Salawu, B. "Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Management Strategies": European Journal of Social Sciences, 13(3) 2010: 345-353.

13 Adebayo, R.I. "Religion and National Unity: The Gap between Theory and Practice". Ado Journal of Religions. 2(2), 2003.

14Adeyemi, J.A. "Ethnic Terrorism in Nigeria: A New Dimension to Socio-Political Stagnation". Journal of Human Studies, 4(1), 2005.

15Machava, A. "Towards a Better Conflict Management Framework: the Role of National", 2008.

16Anarfi, J. "From Conflict to Conflict: Migration, Population Displacement and Refugee Flows". Whither Africa: 2004.

17 Takaya, B.J. "Religion, Politics and Peace: Resolving the Nigerian Dilemma", in Olupona, J.K. (eds.) Religion and Peace in a Multi-faith Nigeria: Ile-Ife, Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 1992.

identified major factors that gave rise to the 'politicisation' of ethnic and religious identities in Nigeria as follows:

(i) the existence of two or more ethnic and religious groups with numerical strengths that can significantly affect the outcome and direction of a democratic political process;
(ii) the instrumentalisation of ethnicity and religion as legitimising tools of control in instances of political threats;
(iii) the existence of ascendant radical thinking within a politically significant ethnic or religious group capable of initiating conflicts; and
(iv) the existence of political, social or economic hardships in the society that can cause alliances among ethnic and religious groups.

The available data indicate that between 1980 and 2017, no fewer than 50 religious crises occurred in Nigeria, with their consequent economic, political, and social implications. Otite (1999) argued that most conflicts in Nigeria are premised on land space and resource competition; the disputed jurisdiction of traditional rulers; the creation and location of local government council headquarters; scarce political and economic resources; micro and macro-social structures of Nigeria; population growth and disregard for cultural symbols.

According to a national survey conducted in August 2001 by Afrobarometa, ethno-religious conflict is widespread in Nigeria. Only a few but shocking instances have attracted the attention of the country. The respondents in a nationally representative sample (of adults of 18 years and older) were asked if they had ever experienced violent conflicts in their communities. Most of them reported having experienced such conflicts and attributed the sources of conflicts to boundary and land dispute, religion, ethnic difference, political party disputes, and economic problems (Afrobarometa, 2002)[18].

The above revelation goes to show the extent to which religion and other factors, such as ethnicity, can result into conflict among the inhabitants of the same dwelling. This trend is associated with ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari. This position was taken further by Salawu (2010), who argued that the major cause of what we now see as ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria has to do with the accusation and allegations of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimisation, discriminate marginalisation, nepotism, and bigotry. He further argued that the breakdown of such a vehicle of social control that characterised traditional African societies, such as the family education, law, religion, and political system that served for the well-being of all citizens. Indeed, the malfunctioning of all these important institutions has increased ethnic and communal conflicts in Nigeria (Jega, 2004)[19].

According to Adamu (2002)[20], the activities and proliferation of a new generation of Christian churches were one of the causes of conflict in the

18Afrobarometer. "Violent Social Conflict and Violent Resolution in Nigeria".
Afrobarometer Briefing Paper (2), 2002.
19Jega, I. "Tackling Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria." Newsletter of Social Science
Academy of Nigeria, 5(2), 2002: 35-38.
20Adamu, D. "Issues in Tiv-Jukun Conflict: Land, History and Politics". Jos: Target

northwest of Nigeria. Of particular concern in this study were the aggressive preaching and indiscriminate construction of churches in residential areas that are dominated by Muslims in the zone. For instance, the number of churches in Sokoto increased from less than 10 to almost a hundred in less than a decade. Similarly, there were verbal attacks on other religions by religious leaders during sermons, lack of skills in the non-violent resolution of conflict, and high levels of illiteracy that make followers an easy tool to manipulate in the hands of religious leaders. Bello (2012)[21], on the other hand, argued that the expansion of the Sharia legal system by some state governments further heightened the mistrust between Muslims and Christians, both at the national and local levels. However, Egwu (2001)[22] said that the increase in religious intolerance and the use of religion for political ends were made possible because of the public perception that the government is failing to provide basic needs to Nigerians. As the government is increasingly seen to fail to impact positively in the lives of Nigerians, religion provides an alternative for survival, a feeling of contentment and a way to a better life in heaven. Consequently, strong loyalty towards one's religion rather than government and laws became established in the psyche of Nigerians (Egwu, 2001, cited in Bello, 2012).

While trying to explain the role of culture in social conflicts, Weaver (1998) noted that when people from different cultures came together, misunderstanding and conflict may be caused by their differences. According to Edward (1976), cultures are embedded in every conflict because conflicts arise in human relationships. Cultures affect the ways we name, blame and attempt to control conflicts. On his part, Mokhiber (1990) argued that violent crime and conflict are usually a side effect of poverty in many countries. He noted that societies with more unequal distributions of wealth and power tended to have greater crime and violence problems at both ends of the social spectrum, even though there are societies that are not capitalist-oriented exhibiting high crime and violence as well.

Studies on the conflict over the years have shown that the indigene/settler dichotomy and the issues of citizenship that are rooted in the nebulous national constitutional misconstruction and discriminatory tendencies of elitist politics have been the reinforcing factors for ethno-communal violence in Nigeria (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010)[23]. Nigerians that have their ethnic genealogy elsewhere, even if they were born in a particular state or lived all their lives there, are regarded as settlers (Ibrahim, 2006)[24]. This discriminatory tendency, especially at the local levels, has been a major and potential source of conflict. For instance, discrimination based on indigeneship or citizenship is quite

Publicity, 2002.

21Bello, I. "Conflict and Conflict Resolution Mechanism in Kaduna Metropolis". A Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, Bayero University Kano, 2012.

22 Egwu, S. G. "Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria". Jos: St. Stephen Book House. 2001.

23Ojukwu, C.C. and Onifade, C.A. "Social Capital, Indignity and Identity Politics: the Jos Crisis in Perspective". African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. 4(5), 2010: 173 -180.

24 Ibrahim, J. "Expanding the Human Rights Regime in Africa: Citizens, Indigenes and Exclusion in Nigeria", In L. Wohlgemath and E. Sall (Eds.), Human Rights, Regionalism and the Dilemmas of Democracy in Africa, Dakar: CODESRIA. 2006.

problematic because it is directly tied to individual or group access to societal resources, including political opportunities (Nwanegbo, Odigbo, and Ochanja, 2014).

Explaining the major cause of the indigene/settler crisis in Nigeria, Aluaigba (2008) posited that a more plausible explanation lies in the failure of the Nigerian state to web its numerous ethnic nationalities through the conscious creation of a national structure that will enhance equal rights and justice and access to social welfare for all individuals and groups. For him, these centrifugal identities built around religion, ethnic groupings, indigeneity, settlers, nativity, migrants, non-indigenes, being a southerner, being a northerner, etc. have collectively sharpened the dividing line between Nigerians, thus making cohesive nationhood a more convoluted task. On the other hand, communal clashes occur either due to historical reasons, the struggle for supremacy, border clashes, and land disputes, such as between Umuleri-Aguleri and Ife/Modakeke (Nwaolise, 2005).

The Consequences of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria

Ethno-religious chauvinism or extremism is one of the leading factors responsible for the incessant ethnic and religious crises in sub-Sahara Africa, including Nigeria (Zekariya, 2011)[25]. There is interplay between ethnic conflict and religious crisis in Nigeria which often adds to the dynamism and complexity of the conflicts. Political and ethno-religious conflagrations have severally drawn the country to the precipice of disaster. It has engendered huge human carnage, internal displacements and refugee crisis, loss of investments, strained inter-communal or inter-ethnic relations, and threatened internal security and public order. There is a high level of inter-ethnic and inter-religious vendetta in the country, to the point that it seems that Nigeria is now exhibiting the symptom of a collapsing state, whose members are perpetually at war with one another (Imobighe, 2003)[26]. Thus, the recurring political and ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria have become a matter of great concern to the international community. On account of the nature of the conflicts among other security threats in the country, the United States National Council for Intelligence Report on May 28, 2005, predicted that the nation may disintegrate within 15 years (Onwumah, 2014)[27].

In the words of Adebayo (2010), ethno-religious crises often led to the merciless killings and destruction of property. He argued that the Maitatsine riot in the Kano metropolis in 1980 was like a burning fire during the harmattan in the northern part of the country. The intra-religious riot was said to have claimed 4,177 lives. As if that was not enough, subsequent Maitatsine riots in Bullum-Kutu in Borno State on 26th - 29th October 1982 were pathetic. Imam (2004) recorded the enormous casualty of the Maitatsine uprising of Bullum-

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25Zekariya. A. B. "History and the Challenges to the Institution of Aku Uka in the 21st Century". Jos: PPC Ltd: 2007.
26Imobighe T.A."Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: An Overview". In T.A. Imobighe (Ed.), Civil Society and Ethnic Conflicts Management in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum. 2003.
27Onwumah, A.C. "Communal and Ethno-Religious Crises and their Implications for National Development in Nigeria". University of Ibadan. 2014.

Kuttu that claimed more than four hundred lives, while property that worth over 3 million naira were destroyed or looted. According to him, the Jimeta Maitatsine crisis of 26th February -5th March 1984 claimed one thousand and four lives, while five thousand, nine hundred and thirteen families were displaced. Also, the Gombe Maitatsine disturbance of 26th-28th April 1985 claimed over one hundred lives. The Kafanchan riot of March 1987, in addition to some mosques and churches that were burnt, left about twenty-five people killed and several others hospitalised (Lateju and Adebayo, 2006)[28]. The crises that took place between 11th and 14th October 1990 in Kano left behind a casualty of over 500 lives and million-worth property destroyed. Many lives were equally lost in the 1991 Muslim-Christian religious crisis of Tafawa Balewa in Bauchi State. The October 1991 Tiv-Jukun ethnic crisis was another conflict over land ownership and political domination. The crisis was said to have claimed not less than 5,000 lives with dozens of villages burnt, while up to 150,000 residents fled the war zone in the exodus that followed (*Newswatch*, 1991).

On September 10, 2001, another serious religious crisis enveloped the entire city of Jos as a result of a woman who drove through a street barricaded by a group of Muslim worshippers during a Friday prayer. The level of havoc and destructions caused by the crisis was immeasurable, such that the hitherto serene town became a mass grave of decaying corpses (Lateju and Adebayo, 2006). Similarly, the level of destruction recorded in Kaduna State in the year 2000 as a reaction to the adoption of the Shari'ah was enormous. The crisis engulfed the city, leaving many people dead and property worth millions of naira destroyed (Adebayo, 2010).

Overview of Conflicts in Wukari LGAs.

There are several reported cases of conflicts in the Wukari Community. The bulk of these conflicts are inter-ethnic, religious or both. Noticeable among the conflicts are the Tiv-Jukun conflicts of 1990-1992, 2001-2002, and 2019-2020; Fulani herdsmen and Jukun/Tiv farmers violence of 2012-2018 and Wukari ethno-religious conflicts of 2013-2015. All these conflicts have numerous effects on the social relation and economic activities of the community and the state at large. Jukun and Tiv conflicts are the most prominent conflicts in the Wukari community. There have been series of overt conflicts between the two ethnic groups such as in 1990-1992, 2001-2002, and 2019-2020. There are divergent opinions and perspectives among scholars on the causes and consequences of the Tiv-Jukun conflict (*see* Nyitse, 2014; Akombo, 2016; and Agbu, Zhema, and Useini, 2019). The 1990 conflict between Tiv and Jukun in Wukari and Ibi had devastating effects on almost all settlements. Such effects include burnt-out villages, littered corpses, and household items strewn all over. Statistics by Agbu (2012) show that almost all settlements along with Wukari-Ibi-Sarkin/Kudu; Wukari-Tella; Wukari-Jootar; Wukari-Rafin/Kada-Abako and Wukari-Tsokundi were burnt down by the clashing parties, affecting the

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28Lateju, F.T. and Adebayo, R.I. "Christian-Muslim Encounter in Nigeria and Interfaith Perspective on Religion in Conflict and Peace Building": A Report of the Centre for Interfaith Relations and Cross-Cultural Outreach submitted to Life and Peace Institute, Sweden. 2006.

vulnerable groups such as women and children. Also, the 2001/2002 Tiv-Jukun conflict was another crisis that engulfed the city of Wukari with devastating destruction (Alubo, 2006)[29]. Furthermore, in 2019, another violent conflict erupted between the Jukun and Tiv. Starting from Kente in Wukari LGA on 1st April 2019, the crisis soon engulfed the whole LGA and eventually to other Local Government Areas in southern Taraba State, except in Ussa LGA and Yangtu Special Development Area. Agbu, Zhema, and Useini (2019) have attempted to itemise some of the issues that led to the crisis to include suspicion by the Tiv, of Jukun allying with the Fulani in attacking their settlements. However, the trigger incident for the outbreak was the chasing away of Tiv women from Kente market by one Solomon Ihom (Tiv). The incident led to a fight which eventually escalated into violence. However, Fwaje, Paul, and Tino (2020), summarise the causes of the conflict to include disputes arising from the use of land resources, agitation for traditional and political recognition and claim of land ownership. Between 2019 and 2020, hundreds of people have lost their lives, thousands displaced and several settlements and communities destroyed by both the Tiv and the Jukun.

Between 2013 and 2015, the Wukari community also experienced numerous ethno-religious crises leading to loss of lives, destruction of property, and living many people displaced (*see* Adamu, 2016*)*. The crisis during this period was described as the most devastating event that has ever happened to the Wukari community. The phenomenon destroyed mutual trust between the groups in the town. During this period, there were violent conflicts between the Fulani herdsmen/farmers, Christian/Muslim and Jukun/Tiv farmers. Several communities such as Akwana, Ando-Katswen, Nwukyon, Tunari, Gborucha, and Jandeikura were destroyed and many people were killed.

In the Tiv-Jukun conflict of 2001 as argued by Nnorom and Odigbo (2015)[30], the levels of bloodshed and property destruction in both communities were unimaginable. The destruction was described as despicable and horrendous by the former Senate President David Mark while visiting Akwana, one of the 25 villages reduced to rubble (Adamu, 2002). The Tiv-Jukun conflict is among the numerous ethnic conflicts that have blotted stability and instigated economic and social dislocation in Nigeria lately (Aluaigba, 2008)[31].

Coser and Rosenberg (1969)[32], noted that social conflict (which religious conflict is part of) is a phenomenon that might appear to be the very opposite of cohesion. They indicated that social conflict brings in its wake social cohesion with others. It is seemingly a negative phenomenon that simply tears down the community or conflicting groups within a society. This is the case in Taraba State and particularly Wukari, where since 2013 when the ethno-religious

29Alubo, O. "Ethnic Conflicts and Citizenship Crises in the Central Region". Eddy Asae Nigeria Press, Lagos. 2006.
30Nnorom K., Odigbo, J. "Identity Crisis and the Challenge of Peace Building in Wukari, Nigeria": Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies. 4(1):2015.
31Aluaigba M. T. "The Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Conflict and the Citizenship Question in Nigeria". Aminu Kano Center for Democratic Research and Training. Kano, 2008: Bayero University.
32Coser L. A., and B. Rosenberg. "Sociological Theory". 4th ed. New York: Macmillan. 1976.

conflict took place, communities and different ethnic groups in the area are living in mutual suspicion, divided along both ethnic and religious lines rather than becoming integrated.

Theoretical Platform

This study was anchored on using the conflict theory (Marxist perspective). Conflict theory assumes a system characterised by social inequality where some enjoy parts of the social benefits more than others. It deals with how society is divided into classes based on the relationship to the means of production. The key to Marx's thinking is the idea of social conflict and the struggle between segments of society over valued resources. Social conflict can take many forms. Individuals may quarrel and some people may have long-standing rivalries, as in the case with ethnic and religious groups in Wukari. In Marx's economic theories, the economy is what constitutes the basis of all human life and history. It is the economy that generates the division of labour, class struggle, ethnic identity, consciousness, and all the social institutions which are supposed to maintain the status quo. Those institutions are the superstructure built upon the base of economics. All of the institutions which are prominent in our daily lives, be it the family, religion, government, arts, etc. can only be truly understood when examined with economic forces.

According to Karl Marx's analysis, religion is one of those social institutions which are dependent upon the material and economic realities in a given society. Marx argued that "the religious world is but the reflex of the real world". Furthermore, identity consciousness triggered competition for economic and political resources in Wukari. Thus, the use of exclusion such as indigene or settler was meant to create opportunities for some and exclude others in Wukari's socio-economic development. To conflict theorists, society is not an independent entity greater than the people in it. Rather a society is a group of people who agree and disagree with each other, who cooperate and compete, in the struggle to make a living and participate in their communities. This theory clearly shows the pattern of social inequality and how some categories of people attempt to protect their privileges like the Jukun and the Hausa in Wukari. Based on the backdrop of the arguments by Marx and other conflict theorists, the conflict theory, therefore, appears to be the best in providing postulations that best explain ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari L.G.A. in Taraba state.

Research methodology
Description of the Study Area

The ancient city of Wukari was founded in about 1596 by Aku Katakpa after the disintegration of the Kwararafa Confederation. Wukari was for a while the headquarters of the historically famous Kwararafa Confederacy, which at the zenith of its powers extended to modern Niger, Plateau, Kogi, Nasarawa, and Benue States, and FCT in the north-central geo-political zone, Edo and Cross River in the South-South zone, Kaduna, Kano and Katsina States in the north-west zone and Bauchi, Gombe and Adamawa States in the northeast zone (WEP,

2013)[33]. Wukari is a Local Government Area in Taraba State, Nigeria. Its headquarters is in the town of Wukari on the A4 highway. The Donga River flows through the area and the Benue River forms a boundary with Nasarawa State to the northwest. The town is the base of the Wukari Federation and it has an area of 4,308 km^2 and a population of 241,546 at the 2006 census.

Wukari is multi-ethnic. While the Jukun consider it as their traditional homeland, other ethnic groups, including the Hausa-Fulani and the Tiv have been present in the town for over 200 years (Nwanegbo et al, 2014). Besides its position as the cradle and pride of all Jukun, Wukari has over the years metamorphosed from a spiritual and cultural headquarters of the Jukun to a political and administrative headquarters of the former Wukari Federation, which now consists of Wukari, Donga, Ibi, Takum, Kurmi and Ussa Local Government Areas of Taraba State. Wukari Local Government is also the Zonal Headquarters of the aforementioned Local Government Areas, made up of two Federal constituencies, Wukari 1 and Wukari 2, and ten political wards, which are; Akwana, Avyi, Bantaje, Chonku, Hospital, Jibu, Kente, Puje, Rafin-Kada, and Tsokundi.

The predominant economic activities of the people of Wukari are farming, fishing, pottery, hunting, blacksmithing, and commerce (Zekeriya, 2007). While the Christian-Jukun population is predominantly farmers, the Muslim-Hausa population dominated the market spheres, motor stations, and other business ventures. The cosmopolitan nature of the city and its population density is one of the causes of the identity crisis facing Wukari.

The Research Design

This study adopted a survey research design to gather data, which employed both quantitative and qualitative methods of data gathering to allow diverse means of sourcing data. This ensured that the phenomenon under study was viewed from a broader viewpoint to ensure wider coverage of the problem.

The population of the Study

The population of this research is the entire people of Wukari Local Government Area, who, according to the 2006 Census stood at 241,546. Also, parts of the study population are religious leaders of the Muslim Council, of the Christian Association of Nigeria and Community leaders, as well as NGOs/CBOs concerned with conflict issues in the study area. The reason for selecting the inhabitants of the study area as part of the target population is because they are the ones directly affected and involved in the conflict. Therefore, they would know about the conflict. Religious leaders are included because they are the custodians of religious disciplines and have control over their followers. At the level of NGOs/CBOs, they are part of the population because they are at different levels involved in conducting studies, seminars, and sensitisation

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[33]Women Environmental Programme (WEP). "Report of Rapid Assessment into Incessan Crises in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State". 2013.

workshops to resolve and avert the future occurrence of the conflict. Hence, they are in possession vital information for the study.

Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

A total sample of 307 respondents was selected to represent the total population of Wukari LGA. Therefore, three hundred and seven respondents were engaged in the survey for both the quantitative and qualitative data gathering. This study adopted dual sampling techniques. These are multi-stage cluster sampling and purposive sampling. Cluster sampling was used to reach respondents for questionnaire administration, while purposive sampling was used to sample other respondents for qualitative data gathering through interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

In the first stage, Wukari LGA was divided into clusters based on the 10 political wards in the area as follows:

Cluster A: Akwana, Avyi
Cluster B: Bantaje, Chonku
Cluster C: Hospital, Jibu
Cluster D: Kente, Rafin-kada
Cluster E: Puje, Tsokundi

In the second stage, 5 political wards were purposively selected based on the scale and nature of destruction and the presence or availability of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in those wards. These include Avyi, Bantaje, Hospital, Puje, and Kente wards. Avyi, Hospital and Puje are the metropolitan wards, which serve as the venue of recurring conflict and are most affected by the Wukari ethno-religious conflict. In addition to being a venue of the conflict, Bantaje also served as an IDP camp, particularly for Muslims. Kente is selected based on the fact that it is one of the wards outside the metropolis that is seriously affected by the conflict, as evident in the series of attacks on the Chinkai town of the ward. In the third stage, cluster sampling was employed to create 2 clusters in each of the wards selected in the form of an area or "anguwa".

The fourth and the final stage was directed at the selection of individual households in each of the areas selected where 60 households, 30 from each area in the sampled political wards, were engaged for questionnaire administration using simple random sampling. For qualitative data gathering, Key Informant Interviews (KII) were conducted with one representative each from Muslim Council and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), two community leaders each from Muslim-dominated areas and a Christian-dominated area, and a representative of one NGO within the study area. Also, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted with representatives of two sections of youth, one each from Christian and Muslim youth-based CBOs within Wukari L.G.A. The rationale for conducting KII with religious organisations like JNI and CAN is because they have adequate controls over their followers. For community leaders, they coordinate and regulate day-to-day community issues and programmes. The NGOs help in peace building at different levels, while the FGD to be conducted with youth groups is to solicit information based on their attitudes towards understanding the conflict as it affects them.

Method of Data Collection and Analysis

This study utilised both quantitative and qualitative instruments for data collection. The quantitative instrument entailed the use of a structured questionnaire, containing both open and closed-ended questions bordering on the research questions and objectives. More so, the qualitative instrument entailed the use of a structured key informant interview guide (KII) and FGD to collect qualitative data from religious leaders and the members of concerned organisations. Data elicited through the various instruments employed in the research were subjected to processing where all quantitative data obtained were processed with the use of the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) to input, organise and analyse. The qualitative data obtained from KII and FGDs were tape-recorded, transcribed, interpreted and used in the analysis. Through the application of SPSS, the data generated were presented in percentages, frequency tables, and cross-tabulations.

Section 1: Presentation of Results

The data are based on both quantitative and qualitative techniques used. For the quantitative data, which targeted the general public, a total of three hundred questionnaires (300) were distributed, but two hundred and eighty-nine (289) were successfully filled in and returned. For the qualitative method of data collection, Key Informant Interview (KII), which targeted some representatives of Muslim Council, CAN, community leaders, and a representative of Red Cross Society, while a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) targeted members of CBOs. Therefore, a total of five (5) KIIs and two (2) FGDs were conducted. The data collected from quantitative sources were presented in Tables using frequency and percentage distribution of the data followed by narratives alongside cross-tabulation to enrich the analysis. The responses from qualitative were analysed in an explanatory manner to garnish the data and verbatim quotations were made as appropriate.

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percent
Male	206	71.3
Female	83	28.7
Total	**289**	**100.0**
Marital status	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Single	76	26.3
Married	200	69.2
Divorced	6	2.1
Widowed	7	2.4
Total	**289**	**100.0**
Ethnicity	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Jukun	122	42.2
Hausa	116	40.1
Tiv	12	4.2
Igbo	9	3.1
Others	30	10.4
Total	**289**	**100.0**
Religion	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Christianity	121	41.9
Islam	153	52.9
Traditional Religion	16	5.2
Total	**289**	**100.0**
Level of Education	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Primary Education	7	2.4
Secondary Education	27	9.3
NCE/OND	92	31.8
First Degree/HND	115	39.8
Postgraduate	38	13.1
Others	10	3.5
Total	**289**	**100.0**
Occupation	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Farming	37	12.8
Civil service	118	40.8
Artisanship	3	1.0
Trading	24	8.3
Schooling	73	25.3
Others	34	11.8
Total	**289**	**100.0**
Income	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Below N20,000	110	38.1
N20,001 - N30,000	46	15.9
N30,001 - N40,000	30	10.4
N40,001 - N50,000	21	7.3
Over N50,00	81	28.3
Total	**289**	**100.0**

Source: Researchers' Fieldwork, 2021.

Table 1 shows that male respondents constituted 71.3%, while the female respondents constituted 28.7%. This indicates that majority of the respondents

were males. This difference can be understood based on the nature of religion and cultural influence on the participation of women in the public sphere. The table also reveals that out of the 289 respondents, the age category with the highest number falls between 31-40 years, in other words 37.4%. This is followed by those who fall between the age brackets of 20-30 years, which indicates 29.8% of the total sampled population. Other categories in the order of number and the percentages in each category were those aged between 41-50 years, below 20 years, and 51 years and above that were made up of 14.9%, 9.7%, and 8.3% respectively. The indication from this distribution is that the respondents with the highest percentage fall between 20 and 50 years, which comprise the most active population within the community.

The marital status of the respondents indicates that those who are married accounted for 200 (69.2%), single 76 (26.3%), widowed, 7 (2.4%), and divorced, 2.1% of the total. This presentation shows that respondents that were married constituted the largest with 69.2%. This can be attributed to the matured nature of the population, as shown earlier, where 20-51 years and above constituted 91.3%. For ethnicity, the Jukun had 42.2%, the Hausa had 40.1%, other minority ethnic groups had 10.4%, while the Tiv and the Igbo ethnic groups constituted 4.2% and 3.1% of the total respectively. This shows that the Jukun ethnic group was the majority as earlier pointed out in the historical background of the study, followed by Hausa ethnic group. Regarding the religious inclination of the respondents, the low population of the Tiv ethnic group can be attributed to the mass movement of the group out of Wukari as a result of the incessant conflict with the Jukun people. Those who indicated they are of the Islamic faith form 52.9%, Christian faith, 41.9%, and traditional religion, only 5.5%. Muslims, therefore, form the highest frequency. This is not unconnected with the fact that they dominated areas mostly affected by the Wukari ethno-religious conflict.

From the table, it is easy to discern that most of the respondents have higher education, that is to say, those with First Degree/HND constituted 39.8% followed by NCE/OND (31.8%), postgraduates (13.1%), Secondary Education (9.3%) while those with other Education and primary Education form 3.5% and 2.4% of the total, respectively. The reason why respondents with higher education are more can be explained by the fact that the research involved a questionnaire that demanded that they must necessarily be literate to complete it. Not only that, it was easier for the highly educated to understand and accept the completion of the questionnaire, as well as the probability of their making more informed contributions to the research. The above Table presents the occupational distribution of the respondents in which civil servants have the highest number (40.8%), students (25.3%), farmers (12.8%), others (11.8%) while traders and artisans constituted 8.3% and 1.0% of the total, respectively. This shows that the predominant occupations are bureaucracy, studentship, and farming. This is not unconnected with the presence of two Universities in Wukari while the available fertile land in Wukari encourages agricultural activities. For monthly income, as shown in the table, respondents with monthly income below N20,000 accounted for 38.1%, N20,001 - N30,000 accounted for 15.9%, N30,001 - N40,000 accounted for 10.4%, N40,001 - N50,000 accounted for 7.3% while those that earned over N50,000 were represented by 28.3%. This shows that those that had income below N20,000 represent the majority.

The implication of this is that the majority of the population are low-income earners. It is not unconnected with the occupational status of the respondents, as stated earlier in the table above.

Section 2: Experience of Conflict in Wukari
Table 2: Responses on Whether Respondents Experienced Conflict in the Area

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	273	94.5
No	16	5.5
Total	**289**	**100.0**

Source: Field Work, 2021.

The respondents' opinions in Table 4.9 above on the issue of whether they have any experience of conflicts in Wukari show that 5.5% have not while 94.5% have. This clearly shows that majority of the respondents covered in the study had experienced various conflicts in the area of study. In a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) conducted with a youth Community-Based Organisation, a discussant confirmed that he had not only witnessed the conflict but he was a victim of the conflicts, he said:

> As you can see how I am limping, more than just an experience, here is a lifelong injury I will die with and it is a product of a gunshot during the crisis. FGD, 20th Jan. 2021.

Table 3: Response on the Nature of Conflict in the Area

Nature	Frequency	Percent
Communal centred	9	3.1
Ethnic centred	24	8.3
Ethno-religious	126	43.6
Political	49	17.0
Religious	81	28.0
Total	**289**	**100.0**

Source: Field Work, 2021.

In the table above, responses on the nature of conflict in Wukari LGA show that the respondents who viewed it as communal accounted for 3.1%, ethnic (8.3%), ethno-religious (43.6%), political (17.0%), and religious (28.0%). This indicated that 79.9% have the view that the conflict in Wukari is purely ethnic and religious. Only 17% perceived it as political conflict and 3% as communal.

In a Key Informant Interview (KII) conducted in Wukari on the nature of the conflict in the study area, it was reported that:

> What is obvious about the conflicts is religion because there was a case during the crisis where a Jukun killed his Muslim blood brother due to religious antagonism. In many extended family houses that comprised both the Muslim and Christian Jukun relatives, the majority usually chased the minority brothers away, looted their property and burnt and

destroy their apartments to the ground level. KII, 18th Jan. 2021.[34]

In another interview conducted with the President of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Wukari chapter on the nature of the conflict, the President said:

> It is difficult for one to say directly the kind of conflicts here in Wukari, you cannot call it religion or ethnic, because neither Islam nor Christianity preaches violence, and also Jukuns formed part of both the Muslim and Christian communities in Wukari. To me, it is nothing but a lack of understanding and the work of the devil. KII, 19th Jan. 2021.[35]

A representative of the Red Cross Society of Nigeria has said:

> I think the causes of conflict in Wukari are hidden and perpetuated in the guise of ethnicity or religion. But the underlying motive is struggling for the control over political positions, economic values and relevance. KII, 18th Jan. 2021.[36]

Table 4: Respondents' Relationship with People of Other Ethnic Groups

Relationship	Frequency	Percent
Cordial	171	59.2
Tolerable	100	34.6
Not cordial	15	5.2
Hostile	3	1.0
Total	**289**	**100.0**

Source: Field Work, 2021.

The table shows the respondents' relationship with people of other ethnic groups, where 59.2% said it was cordial, 5.2%, not cordial, 34.6%, tolerable, and 1.0%, hostile. This shows that the majority of the respondents relate cordially with people from other ethnic groups, while 34.6% of the total merely tolerate people from other ethnic groups.

34Interviewee A. in discussion with the authors. January 2021.
35 President of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in discussion with the authors. January 2021.
36Representative of the Red Cross Society of Nigeria in Wukari in discussion with the authors. January, 2021.

Table 5: Respondents' Relationship with People from Other Religious Affiliations

Relationship	Frequency	Percent
Cordial	145	50.2
Tolerable	89	30.8
Not cordial	43	14.8
Hostile	12	4.2
Total	**289**	**100.0**

Source: Field Work, 2021.

Table 5 shows the respondents' relationship with people from other religious groups, where 50.2% said it was cordial, 14.8% said it was not cordial, 30.8% said it was tolerable, and 4.2% said it was hostile. This shows that the majority relate cordially with people from different religious groups, while 30.8% of the total merely tolerate people from different religious groups.

The Testing of Hypotheses and Analysis

The Table below were presented with the hypotheses formulated to guide this work. To achieve this, cross-tabulations and chi-square tests were used to indicate whether there is a relationship or not between the variables in the hypotheses under study. The variables include ethnicity and nature of conflict, the religious affiliation of respondents and perceptions on the influence of indigene-settler divides

Hypothesis: There is no significant relationship between the religious affiliation of respondents and their attitude on the influence of the indigene-settler divide on the conflict

Table 6: Religious Affiliation and Respondents' attitude on the Influence of Indigene-Settler divide on the Conflict

Religious affiliation	Question of Indigene-settler divides		Total
	Yes	**No**	
Islam	133 (87.5%)	19 (12.5%)	**152 (100.0%)**
Christianity	101 (83.5%)	20 (16.5%)	**121 (100.0%)**
Traditional religion	12 (75.0%)	4 (25.0%)	**16 (100.0%)**
Total	**246 (100.0%)**	**43 (100.0%)**	**289 (100.0%)**

Chi-square (X²) cal. 2.233
Chi-square (X²) crit. 2.078

Table 6 above presents opinions on whether there is a significant relationship between the religious affiliation of respondents and perceptions on the influence of the indigene-settler divide. While 87.5% of the Muslim respondents considered the divide as a predisposing factor, 12.5% of them do not blame the divide. For Christians, less than Muslims, 83.5% faulted the divide while 16.5%

did not. 75.0% of the traditional religious followers, which is lower than that of Christians and Muslims faulted the divide and 25.0% of traditionalists, higher than the two other religions did not blame the divide. This is, therefore, a clear indication that Muslims faulted the divide more than that of Christian and Traditional religions. Traditional religionists considered as those that practise the native religion, faulted the divide less than that of the two other religions. This finding is not unconnected with the fact that the Hausa people, who are predominantly Muslims, faulted the divide more because they are the ones being marginalised simply because the Jukun marginalised and considered them as settlers. Hence in Wukari, they are segregated and denied certain privileges compared to the Jukun, particularly the Christians. This is confirmed by a community leader in one of the Muslims areas. He said:

> The issue of the indigene-settler divide is of great influence to Wukari crises, there is serious segregation along this line, our children find it difficult to obtain indigene letters, Local Government employment, even election to political offices that was hitherto dominated by Hausa/Jukun Muslims is now gradually becoming difficult for us and even though some Hausa communities have been here long before the coming of colonial masters. This is extended to Jukun Muslims because some elements are forcing Christianity to be the official religion of the L.G.A. KII, 22nd Jan. 2021.[37]

This discriminatory tendency, especially at the local levels, has been a major and potential source of conflict. For instance, discrimination based on indigeneship or citizenship is quite problematic because it is directly tied to individual or group access to societal resources, including political opportunities (Nwanegbo et al., 2014). In fact, for the Christian Jukun and the traditionalists, the Jukun/Hausa Muslims are settlers and should be prevented from playing a central role in the affairs of the Jukun and/or partaking in opportunities meant for the Jukun. Less than that of the Muslims, 83.5% of the Christian respondents faulted the divides, and also higher than that of the Muslims, 16.5% of the Christian respondents do not see the divides as having any influence on the conflict. Out of 16 traditional religion respondents, 12 (75.0%) faulted the divide and 4 (25%) did not. The chi-square table value showed that X^2Cal 2.233 is greater than X^2Cri 2.078 (X^2Cal 2.233 >X^2Cr 2.078), which means that there is a significant relationship between the religious affiliation of respondents and attitude on the influence of the indigene-settler divide. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The challenges posed by incessant crises based on religion and ethnicities are life-threatening to this country. This threat, therefore, demands immediate attention to neutralise its centrifugal tendency. Considering the protracted nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari and the attendant destructions of lives and property, many questions arise. These revolve around the causes and the negative consequences of ethno-religious on the social, economic, and

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37 Community leader in discussion with the authors. January 2021.

political life of people living in the study area. The crisis has created a sharp division along religious and ethnic lines and further entrenched in the community. The relocation of both ethnic groups to either side of the city has political, economic, and social implications. It has a serious impact on the reconciliation and integration of society. It also results in stagnation in the economic, social, and political development of Wukari. Overcoming the problem of the eruption of conflicts remains a challenge to any regime. Indeed, it is imperative to begin to nurture a principle of citizenship that is all-inclusive, strengthening the rule of law, curbing poverty and youth restiveness, among other things. From what has been discovered in the research concerning the causes, consequences, and measures through which ethno-religious conflict can be averted, the following recommendations are proffered for the effective resolution of such crises.

There should be adequate provision of security and the law enforcement agencies should be given a free hand to perform their duties. Therefore, the culture of identifying and punishing erring members of the community should be ensured irrespective of religious, ethnic or family background. Sermons and preaching in churches and mosques should be coordinated and monitored by religious bodies to prevent mischief and hatred propagation. It is revealed in the study that the influence of the indigene-settler divide was at the root cause of the crises. Therefore, it is imperative to redefine the status and character of Nigerian citizenship. First, there is the need to address the issue of citizenship rights constitutionally. This can be done through a constitutional amendment that should clearly state that Nigerians have inalienable rights of residence and to contest for public office, own land, and have access to social benefits such as employment and scholarship in any part of the country. Awareness, enlightenment, and sensitisations of the public on the dangers of conflict and creating understanding among leaders and the adherents of all religious and ethnic groups should be done. To cushion their grudges, it is imperative to identify Internally Displaced Persons so that the government and stakeholders can reach them to alleviate their sufferings and resettlement on one hand, and for reconciliation to begin on the other hand.

Efforts should also be made to form and inaugurate Joint Community Vigilantes that will cut across ethnic and religious lines within the polarised communities in Wukari. The vigilantes, with their knowledge of the concerned communities through their membership of the communities will help law enforcement agents in maintaining law and order within the crisis zone.

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